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Unexpected medical care spending imposes considerable 
financial risk on developing country households. Based on 
managed care models of health insurance in wealthy countries, 
Colombia’s Régimen Subsidiado is a publicly financed insurance 
program targeted to the poor, aiming both to provide risk 
protection and to promote allocative efficiency in the use of 
medical care. Using a “fuzzy” regression discontinuity design, 
we find that the program has shielded the poor from some 
financial risk while increasing the use of traditionally under-
utilized preventive services – with measurable health gains. 
In developing countries, the inability to smooth consumption directly reduces 
welfare and leads to informal risk management strategies that stifle productive 
activity (Paxson 1993, Townsend 1994, Morduch 1995). Because unexpected 
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illness is a leading source of economic risk, the expansion of health insurance is 
therefore a public policy priority in many parts of the developing world (Gertler 
and Gruber 2002, GTZ, WHO, and ILO 2005, WHO 2010, Mohanan 2012).
1
 
Such initiatives are often large, centrally-planned programs operated exclusively 
through the public sector – and they focus primarily on reducing the out-of-pocket 
price of medical care.
2
 
An early exception is Colombia’s Régimen Subsidiado (or “Subsidized 
Regime,” henceforth “SR”). Introduced in 1993, the SR is a pluralistic, publicly-
financed health insurance program targeted to the poor.
3
 Colombians meeting a 
proxy means-test (determined by the Sistema de Identificación de Beneficiarios, 
or SISBEN) are fully-subsidized to purchase insurance from private, government-
approved insurers. In contrast to the classical ‘managed competition’ model of 
insurance (Enthoven 1978a and 1978b), participating insurers must offer 
standardized benefits packages and accept standardized premiums. Insurers can, 
however, form restrictive medical care networks, deny reimbursement for services 
deemed ‘unnecessary,’ and pay health care providers in ways that encourage 
higher quality and lower cost medical care (through capitated payment contracts, 
for example – fixed payments per enrollee per month). Overall, Colombia’s SR 
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 For example, one study finds that 5% of Latin American households spend 40% or more of ‘non-
subsistence’ income on medical care each year (Xu et al. 2003). As Gertler and Gruber (2002) 
note, there are two major costs of illness: medical care costs and reduced labor income. Health 
insurance (our focus) addresses the former, while disability insurance addresses the latter. 
2
 See Abel-Smith (1992); Dow et al. (1997); WHO (2000); WHO Commission on 
Macroeconomics and Health (2001); Gertler and Solon (2002); Dow, Gonzalez, and Rosero-Bixby 
(2003); Dow and Schmeer (2003); Gakidou et al. (2006); Pauly et al. (2006); Hughes and 
Leethongdee (2007); Wagstaff (2007); Wagstaff and Yu (2007); O’Donnell et al. (2008); Pauly, 
Blavin, and Meghan (2008); and Gruber, Hendren, and Townsend (2012). 
3 According to Article 153 of Law 100 (authorizing the creation of the SR), one of the SR’s 
guiding principles is Proteccion Integral: “The System of Social Security in health will provide 
health care to the population in: education, information, health promotion and prevention, 
diagnostic, treatment and rehabilitation in quantity and quality according to the Plan Obligatorio 
de Salud.” 
shares features of managed care models of health insurance that emphasize cost-
containment and allocative efficiency traditionally found only in wealthy 
countries. It therefore represents important early experience in a markedly 
different institutional environment. 
This paper studies the impact of the SR on financial risk protection, service use, 
and health outcomes among Colombia’s poor. Program eligibility is supposed to 
be determined according to a discrete threshold in the continuous SISBEN index, 
so in principle we could use a regression discontinuity design to do so. Because 
SISBEN scores are manipulated in practice (BDO and CCRP 2000, DNP 2001, 
2003a, and 2003b, Fresneda 2003, Camacho and Conover 2011), we instead use 
underlying index components collected through independent household surveys to 
generate our own (un-manipulated) SISBEN score calculations. We then 
instrument for SR enrollment with our re-constructed eligibility measure (Hahn, 
Todd, and Van der Klaauw 2001). In general, our estimates are robust across a 
variety of parametric and non-parametric specifications. 
Despite our strategy for addressing manipulation of eligibility, our approach has 
limitations. First, because we use household surveys to implement a “fuzzy” 
regression discontinuity design, our samples are relatively small. Second, we 
measure SISBEN index components after official SISBEN classification 
occurred, presumably resulting in a degree of measurement error. Third, due to 
financial shortfalls, many of Colombia’s municipios (hereafter, “counties”) used 
eligibility thresholds that fell short of the official one. Following Chay, McEwan, 
and Urquiola (2005), we therefore estimate and use county-specific thresholds. 
These limitations introduce noise into the regression discontinuity design and 
generally bias us against finding behavioral responses to the SR.  
We first find evidence that by the mid-2000s, the SR succeeded in protecting 
poor Colombians from financial risk associated with the medical costs of 
unexpected illness. In particular, SR enrollment appears to have reduced the 
variability of out-of-pocket spending for inpatient care. Despite this reduction in 
risk, however, we observe little evidence of meaningful portfolio choice effects 
(changes in the composition of household assets, human capital investments, or 
household consumption), perhaps because the SR falls short of providing full 
insurance. 
Our results also suggest that SR enrollment is associated with large increases in 
the use of traditionally under-utilized preventive services – some of which nearly 
doubled. Moreover, we find evidence of health improvement under the SR as well 
– specifically, gains along margins sensitive to the increases in preventive care 
that we observe. There is more mixed evidence of changes in the use of curative 
services (although theoretical predictions about the use of curative care are 
ambiguous).  
We conclude by discussing the underlying behavioral mechanisms that may 
explain our results. Because the SR is complex and multi-faceted, it is important 
to note that we cannot draw firm inferences about them; we emphasize this as an 
important direction for future research. Overall, we highlight two mechanisms 
that we suspect are important: high-powered supply-side incentives and the 
possibility that enrollees receive care from higher-quality private sector facilities. 
I. Background and Policy Context 
A. Public Sector Health Insurance for Colombia’s Poor Prior to the Reform 
Prior to the introduction of the SR in 1993, roughly 25% of Colombians (a 
subset of those with formal sector jobs) had any form of explicit health insurance 
(Pinto 2008). However, Colombians lacking formal insurance also had a degree of 
implicit insurance provided through the public sector. Specifically, they could 
receive medical care from public sector hospitals and clinics for a fraction of the 
full cost of their services; out-of-pocket payments were generally progressive and 
loosely based on socio-economic status. Public sector facilities, in turn, covered 
their losses with direct transfers from national and local governments, and health 
care professionals were typically paid fixed salaries that did not reward 
productivity. Thus, poor Colombians effectively had a degree of implicit health 
insurance coupled with inefficient provider incentives – and the reform that we 
study aimed to expand coverage while improving efficiency. 
B. Overview of Colombia’s Subsidized Health Insurance Regime for the Poor 
Under Law 100 in 1993, Colombia introduced the SR, a novel form of publicly-
financed health insurance for the poor (Gwatkin, Wagstaff and Yazbeck 2005, 
Escobar 2005). Primarily through SR expansion, formal health insurance 
coverage in Colombia grew from about 25% of the population in 1993 to 80% in 
2007 (CENDEX 2008). The SR is organized as a variant of the classical 
‘managed competition’ model (Enthoven 1978a and 1978b). Beneficiaries are 
fully subsidized to purchase health insurance from competing health plans. 
During our study period (the mid-2000s), subsidies were financed by a 
combination of public resources including payroll taxes and national and local 
general revenue. These resources are transferred to county governments, which in 
turn are responsible for eligibility determination, enrollment, and contracting with 
health plans. This role of local government has important implications for our 
empirical analysis. 
Health plans charge county health authorities a government-regulated premium 
per enrollee and offer a standardized package of benefits (see Appendix A for the 
details of these benefits).
4
 Participating health plans then act as group purchasers 
of health services for their enrollees by contracting with a network of health 
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 During our study period, the benefits package of the SR (Plan Obligatorio de Salud Subsidiado) 
emphasized coverage for primary and basic outpatient services, drugs, and some catastrophic care. 
There was limited coverage for specialist services, and there were substantial gaps in coverage for 
hospital care.  
facilities and clinicians. Because premiums and benefit packages are standardized 
by law (unlike the classical ‘managed competition’ model), health plans compete 
for enrollees on the basis of provider networks and service quality. In practice, 
however, very few cities had more than one insurer during the years that we 
study. 
Insurers’ ability to contract with health care providers (hospitals and medical 
groups) for more efficient service provision is a central innovation of the SR. 
Insurers receive premiums (fixed payments per enrollee per unit time) for all 
covered services, giving them strong incentives to constrain total spending. 
Insurers then (partially) transmit these incentives to provider organizations 
through capitated payment contracts, and they have the authority to deny 
reimbursement for services deemed inefficient.
5
  
In the next section we describe the major demand- and supply-side incentive 
changes under the SR, and Section II then provides predictions based on them for 
health service use, out-of-pocket spending on medical care, and health outcomes. 
C. Changes in Demand- and Supply-Side Incentives under the SR 
There were important changes in both demand- and supply-side incentives with 
the introduction of the SR. On the demand-side, out-of-pocket prices for covered 
curative services are 10% of the full price (as opposed to 30% for poor uninsured 
Colombians).
6
 Moreover, total out-of-pocket spending per episode of illness each 
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 Provider organizations, in turn, must transmit the incentives they face to individual clinicians 
whom they employ. Our interviews with stakeholders in the Colombian health care system suggest 
that organizations solve this agency problem through non-financial rather than payment-based 
incentives (systematic data on organizational incentives and clinician contracts is unfortunately 
unavailable). 
6
 The Colombian Ministry of Social Protection maintains a fee schedule (SOAT) regulating out-of-
pocket prices. For example, the full price for a physician consultation was 17,300 pesos in 2007 
and 18,460 pesos in 2008 (approximately US $10). Medical facility social workers assess 
uninsured patients’ “ability to pay” and may charge them sliding scale out-of-pocket fees (greater 
than 10% of the full price) on a case-by-case basis. 
year is capped at half of the monthly minimum wage for SR beneficiaries – while 
the same cap is six times as large for uninsured patients (Decreto 2357 and 
Acuerdo 260 of the Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Social en Salud). Notably, 
preventive services are essentially free regardless of insurance status. 
On the supply-side, changes in provider payment contracts created substantially 
different incentives for the provision of health services. Specifically, there are two 
types of contracts between insurers and provider organizations under the SR: 
capitated primary care contracts and fee-for-service specialty care contracts. For 
primary care, insurers pay providers fixed amounts per month for all services used 
by enrollees (“capitation”). These contracts create strong incentives for providers 
to constrain total spending on primary care and have important implications for 
both preventive and curative health care (as discussed in the next section). 
Importantly, promotion of preventive care can be a central means of reducing 
total expenditures.
7
 
For specialty care, insurers generally pay providers a pre-determined fee for 
each covered service that they supply (i.e., on a “fee-for-service” basis). These 
contracts encourage the provision of all reimbursable services (both efficient and 
inefficient). However, SR insurers also have the authority to deny reimbursement 
on a case-by-case basis for inefficient specialty care (termed “utilization review”), 
allowing them to limit wasteful service use.
8
 
D. Eligibility for the SR 
Eligibility for the SR is determined using a poverty-targeting index called 
SISBEN (or Sistema de Identificación de Beneficiarios). The original SISBEN 
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 Many medical professionals believe that increasing prevention reduces overall medical spending 
– whether or not this is true depends on prices, the health production function, and competing 
risks. Cohen, Neumann and Weinstein (2008) find that 20% of preventive measure in the US are 
cost saving. 
8
 Utilization review does little to promote services traditionally used sub-optimally. 
index consisted of fourteen components measuring different aspects of household 
well-being (such as housing material, access to public utilities, ownership of 
durable assets, demographic composition, educational attainment, and labor force 
participation – for a complete description, see Appendix B).9 On each dimension, 
households are classified according to mutually exclusive, collectively exhaustive 
categories with varying weights assigned to each category; these weights vary 
between urban and rural areas. A household’s SISBEN score is then calculated by 
summing points across components. Possible scores range from 0 to 100 (with 0 
being the most impoverished) and are divided into six strata. Households scoring 
in SISBEN strata 1 and 2 (the lowest strata) are eligible for the SR (below 48 in 
urban areas, below 31 in rural areas).
10
 
E. Eligibility and Enrollment in Practice 
Although eligibility for the SR increases the likelihood of enrollment, neither 
one necessarily implies the other for at least three reasons: misclassification or 
manipulation of SISBEN scores, shortfalls in local government revenue, and 
enrollment that preceded SISBEN enumeration.
11
 
First, both local governments and households have incentives to manipulate 
SISBEN scores. Local governments receive fixed transfers from the national 
government for each resident they enroll, creating incentives to maximize 
enrollment. The selective enrollment of key constituents can also provide political 
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 Eligibility also varies within households because certain demographic groups (including 
pregnant women and young children) are prioritized for enrollment. 
10
 SISBEN eligibility shifts abruptly at each county’s cabecera boundary, an administrative 
demarcation formally distinguishing urban and rural parts of each county and loosely 
corresponding to the fringe of public utility infrastructure. Distinct urban and rural SISBEN scales 
are applied to households on corresponding sides of the boundary, differing both in component 
parts and in the weighting of response categories for each component. We implemented a research 
design exploiting these urban/rural index differences, but inconsistent application of the rural 
index and data limitations prevent us from drawing meaningful conclusions from it. In this paper 
we therefore focus on urban eligibility. 
11
 Administrative mistakes in the enrollment process are also important. 
benefits (Camacho and Conover 2011). Households prefer enrollment over 
“uninsurance” as well because co-payments are lower for SR beneficiaries than 
for those lacking formal insurance. Consistent with both types of incentives, there 
is evidence of considerable SISBEN score manipulation between 1997 and 2003 
(Camacho and Conover 2011).
12
 
Second, most local governments lack sufficient revenue to finance the 
enrollment of all eligible residents. According to law, those with lower SISBEN 
scores and those belonging to specific targeted groups (such as children under five 
and pregnant women) are therefore prioritized for enrollment.
13
 This means that 
many counties use de facto eligibility thresholds that fall below the uniform 
national threshold. 
Third, some counties began enrolling residents in the SR before all of their 
residents had been classified using SISBEN. These counties instead used other 
means-test criteria such as residents’ estrato, a neighbourhood-level measure of 
socio-economic status used to establish electricity prices paid by local 
households. 
In general, these realities of the program’s implementation have two broad 
implications for our empirical analyses (which we discuss in greater detail in 
Section IIIB). One is the necessity of an empirical strategy that addresses 
manipulation of SISBEN scores. The other is that de facto county threshold must 
be estimated (because they are not officially reported).  
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 Using results from the 2005 population census, the Colombian newspaper El Tiempo reports 
that there are more SR enrollees than residents in some counties (El Tiempo, October 26, 2006). 
Camacho and Conover (2011) show that the distribution of official SISBEN scores exhibits both 
large leftward shifts in density over time and the formation of a mass point just to the left of the 
national eligibility threshold in urban areas. Neither are present in Colombian household surveys. 
The former suggests misrepresentation by households, while the latter suggests misrepresentation 
by enumerators or officials. 
13
 The laws formalizing this prioritization are Acuerdos 244 and 253 of the Consejo Nacional de 
Seguridad Social en Salud. This prioritization also means that although SISBEN scores are 
calculated at the level of family “nucleus,” individuals within families can vary in enrollment 
status; we observe this in our household survey data. 
F. Previous Studies 
Several previous empirical papers have studied Colombia’s SR as well (see 
Giedion and Uribe (2009) for a comprehensive review). Trujillo, Portillo, and 
Vernon (2005) use propensity score matching to compare SR enrollees to 
observationally similar uninsured Colombians, finding that the SR is associated 
with greater medical care use. Giedion et al. (2009) also use propensity score 
matching and find that SR enrollment is associated with more visits to health care 
providers, higher vaccination coverage rates, and fewer reports of not seeking 
medical care for financial reasons. Gaviria, Medina, and Mejía (2007) instrument 
for SR enrollment using length of time a household head lived in his/her current 
place of residence and report that SR enrollment is associated with better self-
reported health, more preventive and curative outpatient care, and fewer 
hospitalizations. Finally, matching official SISBEN score data with birth records, 
Camacho and Conover (2008) use a regression discontinuity design in two 
samples: a county lacking clear evidence of manipulation and selected counties 
observed shortly after SR implementation. They find that SR enrollment is 
associated with increased birth weight and better APGAR scores but not antenatal 
care use, medical supervision of deliveries, or probability of hospital delivery. 
Relative to previous studies of the SR, our paper employs a different strategy for 
addressing manipulation of program eligibility, uses an approach that disentangles 
the role of the SR from other public programs using SISBEN, and studies a 
broader range of behavioral responses to health insurance.
14
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 See Card, Dobkin, and Maestas (2008), Card, Dobkin, and Maestas (2009), Chandra, Gruber, 
and McKnight (2010a), and Anderson, Dobkin, and Gross (2012) for recent regression 
discontinuity studies of health insurance in the United States. For recent work on the United States 
using other methodologies, see Doyle (2005), Dafny and Gruber (2005), Finkelstein (2007), 
Finkelstein and McKnight (2008), Kolstad and Kowalski (2010), Chandra, Gruber, and McKnight 
(2010b), and Kowalski (2011). 
II. Empirical Predictions on the Interaction of Supply- and Demand-Side 
Incentives 
Although we emphasize the centrality of changes in supply-side incentives 
under the SR, out-of-pocket prices for covered services also fell. This section 
therefore considers the joint effect of supply- and demand-side changes in 
formulating predictions about changes in risk protection, the use of preventive and 
curative services, and health outcomes. Section IV then provides empirical 
evidence on each. 
Risk Protection and Out-of-Pocket Medical Spending.— Protecting households 
against medical care costs associated with unexpected illness is a central objective 
of health insurance. As Appendix A shows, the SR covers many of the most 
expensive services including trauma care, dialysis, and major joint replacement 
(hips and knees, for example). It also caps total out-of-pocket spending per 
episode of illness each year at half of the monthly minimum wage. The SR should 
therefore reduce the variability of out-of-pocket medical spending. Assuming that 
the price elasticity of demand for medical care is less than one, the SR should also 
reduce total out-of-pocket spending for medical care. 
Preventive Health Services.— Most preventive services in Colombia are free 
regardless of insurance status (i.e., free both for SR enrollees and the uninsured), 
so the main difference in incentives for preventive care originate on the supply-
side. Primary care providers are paid on a capitated basis, so they have strong 
incentives to limit total primary care spending. Increasing preventive service use 
can reduce the need for more costly curative care – and can therefore be cost-
saving – so capitated primary care incentives are likely to increase preventive care 
use.
15
  
An opposing force at work is ex ante moral hazard: SR enrollees may have 
weaker incentives to use preventive services because they pay less for curative 
care (Nordquist and Wu 1976, Phelps 1978). Although we fail to find evidence of 
ex ante moral hazard (as shown in Section IVE) and there is little evidence of it in 
other studies (Kenkel 2000), our preventive care estimates reflect the net effect of 
these forces.
16
 Because preventive services generate important positive 
externalities (both pecuniary and infectious disease-related), increases in their use 
presumably improve welfare.
17
   
Curative Medical Care.— Three changes under the SR are likely to influence the 
use of curative medical care: reductions in out-of-pocket prices, increases in the 
use of preventive services, and supply-side incentives for limiting total medical 
spending. First, for negative price elasticities of demand, reductions in out-of-
pocket prices will increase the use of curative care. This increase is inefficient 
under standard assumptions (ex post moral hazard); however, curative care in 
developing countries may produce positive externalities, and there may also be 
important credit constraints. Second, any increases in preventive service use may 
reduce the use of curative care (an efficient result). Third, both capitation and 
utilization review produce incentives for providers to limit the use of curative 
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 One randomized controlled trial in the US and another in the UK show that capitation increases 
preventive service use (Manning et al. 1984, Lennon et al. 1990). This finding is also consistent 
with the evidence from observational studies summarized by Miller and Luft (1994) and more 
recent research by Keenan et al. (2009). 
16
 The RAND Health Insurance Experiment reports no sizeable or significant effect of insurance 
coverage on health behaviors (smoking, drinking, and exercise) (Newhouse and the Insurance 
Experiment Group 1993). Medicare coverage has also been reported not to increase unhealthy 
behaviors (Dave and Kaestner 2006). 
17
 Popular conditional cash transfer programs – including the Familias en Acción program in 
Colombia – aim to increase the use of preventive services even though they are otherwise 
available for free. At least eleven developing countries have introduced such conditional cash 
transfer programs (Fiszbein and Schady 2009). 
medical care. Some reductions may be efficient (counterbalancing demand-side 
incentives leading to ex post moral hazard) while others may be inefficient 
(leading to “stinting” – see for example Ellis and McGuire (1990), Holmstrom 
and Milgrom (1991), Ma and McGuire (1997), and McGuire (2000)). Predictions 
about changes in curative care under the SR as well as their welfare implications 
are therefore ambiguous. 
Health Outcomes.— Both preventive and curative services are inputs into health 
production. If at least one of these two types of care increases and neither of them 
decreases, health should presumably improve to some degree. Alternatively, the 
prediction is ambiguous if one type increases and the other decreases. In our 
empirical analyses, we are able to examine the prevalence of infectious diseases 
common among children (diarrhea, cough and fever) as well as the number of 
days lost to illness. 
III. Data and Empirical Strategy 
A. Data 
Our empirical approach requires household survey data containing three types 
of information: (1) enrollment in the SR, (2) components of the SISBEN index 
(enabling us to simulate SR eligibility), and (3) potential behavioral responses and 
outcomes of interest (both welfare-improving and distortionary). There are two 
candidate Colombian household surveys that meet these criteria: the Encuestas de 
Calidad de Vida (ECV) and the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS). The 
ECVs are nationally-representative household surveys designed to measure socio-
economic well-being and “quality of life,” broadly defined. The DHS data reports 
detailed fertility, health, and socio-economic information for nationally-
representative samples of fertile age women (defined as ages 15-49) and their 
households. Because the de facto implementation of the SR occurred in 
1996/1997, we use the 2003 ECV and the 2005 DHS for our analyses.
18
 Table 1 
shows descriptive statistics by type of behavior/outcome for the full samples as 
well as those with and without SR coverage. 
As our empirical strategy requires, we calculate household-level SISBEN 
scores to simulate SR eligibility because simulated eligibility should not reflect 
manipulation of SISBEN scores (Camacho and Conover 2011).
19
 However, not all 
household surveys contain all necessary components of the SISBEN index. 
Appendix B provides a complete description of the SISBEN components present 
in each survey.
20
 We impute values using ordered probit models for the few 
variables that are missing (firm size and per-capita income in the DHS and 
primary roof material in both surveys). Estrato is also missing for some 
households and we impute them on the basis of the most common in the 
household’s neighborhood.  
B. Empirical Strategy 
Instrumenting for Enrollment with Simulated Eligibility.—In principle, the 
SISBEN index’s SR eligibility threshold can be used to study behavioral 
responses associated with SR enrollment. This discontinuity induces an abrupt 
shift in eligibility (and enrollment) along otherwise smooth distributions of 
household characteristics; coincident shifts in behaviors and outcomes can 
reasonably be linked to the program. However, adverse or propitious selection 
into eligibility – or manipulation according to unobserved household 
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 There was also a Colombian DHS survey conducted in 2000, but it is much smaller and contains 
few outcome variables of interest. We do not use the 1997 wave of the ECV because SR 
enrollment was still very low in that year. 
19
 Reliable official SISBEN scores are also not available in the datasets that we use. 
20
 In theory, SISBEN scores should be calculated at the family (or “nucleus”) level. However, we 
treat entire households as families given reports that SISBEN enumerators adopted this definition 
in practice due to difficulties in conforming to the technical definition. 
characteristics, as discussed in Section IE – is likely to bias the estimates of 
interest (McCrary 2008). 
To circumvent this difficulty, we employ an instrumental variables strategy 
closely resembling one proposed by Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw (2001). 
Conceptually, we seek to reconstruct ‘true’ SISBEN scores when both official 
SISBEN scores and observed SR enrollment reflect manipulation. To do so, we 
calculate SISBEN scores for each household in the ECV and DHS data and then 
use calculated scores to instrument for SR enrollment (for prominent examples of 
simulated instruments, see Currie and Gruber (1996a and 1996b), and Cutler and 
Gruber (1996), and Hoxby (2001)).
21
 
Using urban households with simulated SISBEN scores near the urban 
eligibility threshold (we do not use rural households because of sufficiently 
inconsistent application of the rural scale)
22
, we could in principle begin by 
estimating the following first-stage equation for individuals i in household h: 
(1)  enrollih = α + γbelowh + βSISBENh + Σkδkestratohk + εih, 
where enroll is an indicator for whether or not individual i is enrolled in the SR, 
below is an indicator for simulated SISBEN score lying below the eligibility 
threshold, SISBEN is simulated SISBEN score, and estrato is a dummy variable 
for an estrato category (a neighborhood-level measure of socio-economic status 
used to establish electricity prices paid by local households). Using Two-Stage 
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 We emphasize “old” SISBEN scores – those calculated using the official scale in effect between 
the beginning of the SR and 2003. Enrollees eligible only under the old scale were not disenrolled 
with the introduction of the “new scale,” and the old (but not the new) eligibility discontinuity is 
evident in the 2005 DHS. 
22
 The combination of smaller sample size and inconsistent application of the scale in rural areas 
means that our first-stage relationships are considerably weaker than in urban areas. In the DHS, 
the first-stage F-statistics are about 9 for the sample of children (N=574) and about 3 for the 
sample of mothers (N=302). In the ECV, the first-stage F-statistics are about 18, but the size of the 
rural sample is roughly one quarter of the urban one (1318 vs. 4129).  
 
 
Least Squares (2SLS), we could then estimate the following second-stage 
equation: 
(2) outcomeih = φ + λenrollih + θSISBENh + Σkπkestratohk + ξih, 
instrumeting for enroll with below. The relationship between behavioral outcomes 
of interest (outcome) and SR enrollment would then be captured by estimates of 
the parameter λ.  
Estimating County-Specific Eligibility Thresholds.— As described in Section IE, 
financial shortfalls led many Colombian counties to use SR eligibility thresholds 
at SISBEN scores below the official national threshold. We therefore use county-
specific eligibility thresholds.  In addition to improving the strength of our first 
stage, this approach offers another key benefit: because some local governments 
use the official national threshold for other public benefits, changes in outcomes 
observed at county-specific SR thresholds will not reflect behavioral responses to 
other public programs. (Section IVA shows that participation in other public 
programs is not discontinuous at county-specific thresholds.) 
Exact county-specific eligibility thresholds are unknown, so we estimate them 
following Chay, McEwan, and Urquiola (2005). Specifically, using our full 
samples, we establish county-specific breaks in SR eligibility at the SISBEN 
score that maximize the goodness-of-fit of a model of SR enrollment as a function 
of a dichotomous indicator for whether or not a household’s score falls below the 
threshold.
23
 This approach establishes thresholds that maximize the percentage of 
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 There are 84 counties in the ECV and 220 counties in the DHS. We exclude individuals from a 
few counties using two criteria related to having very few observations in some counties. One is 
having the first percentile in the SISBEN score distribution lie above the national threshold or the 
99
th
 percentile score lie below the national threshold. The other is having an estimated threshold 
with those below it having relatively lower SR enrollment rates than those above it. The total 
number of observations excluded for these reasons is minor (3.8% of the sample in the ECV data 
individuals correctly classified as eligible in each county. Threshold means in the 
ECV and DHS are 45.03 and 45.83, respectively, and their interquantile ranges 
are 4.96 and 3.89. Intuitively, estimated thresholds are positively correlated with 
current county income (the sum of taxes, transfers from the state, and non-tax 
income) and negatively correlated with the share of households having unmet 
basic needs.
24
  
We then use county-specific thresholds to re-code the variable below for each 
individual i in households h and Colombian counties c and estimate the following 
first stage equation: 
(3)    enrollihc = α + γbelowhc + βSISBENh + φSISBEN_diffhc + Σkδkestratohk + μc + εihc, 
where below is now an indicator for whether or not individual i’s simulated 
SISBEN score falls below the eligibility threshold in the individual’s county c, 
SISBEN_diff is the difference between an individual’s simulated SISBEN score 
and the estimated eligibility threshold in the individual’s county (i.e., relative 
SISBEN score), μc represents county fixed effects (allowing us to focus on within-
county variation in simulated eligibility across county-specific thresholds), and all 
other variables are defined as in equation (1). To adhere transparently to the 
identifying assumption that individuals with simulated SISBEN scores very near 
the threshold are comparable with the exception of their eligibility, we 
conservatively focus on individuals whose calculated scores lie within two index 
                                                                                                                                     
and 5.2% of the sample in the DHS data). Estimated thresholds are constrained to be lower than 49 
to allow for measurement error. 
24
 To assess this, we ran an OLS regression of county-specific eligibility thresholds on current 
county income and the share of households in the county having unmet basic needs (a composite 
indicator that collapses across household population density, water source, toilet availability at 
home, education of household head, ratio of employed household members to all household 
members, and children’s school attendance rate). Using the ECV sample, the estimate for current 
county income is 0.0091 with a standard error of 0.004; in the DHS, the estimate is 0.0043 with a 
standard error of 0.002. For the share of households with unmet basic needs, the estimates are -
0.0456 and -0.0444 with standard errors of 0.024 and 0.015, respectively.  
points of the county-specific cutoff (our main estimates persist across various 
bandwidths, as shown in Section IVF).
25
 
Figures 1A and 1B use ECV and DHS data to show SR enrollment and 
“uninsurance” by simulated SISBEN score relative to county-specific eligibility 
thresholds. Each county’s threshold is normalized to zero, and the figure then 
shows means and 95% confidence intervals for each SISBEN index integer 
relative to the threshold as well as non-parametric kernel density plots on either 
side. The figure illustrates large discrete increases in the probability of enrollment 
and concomitant decreases in the probability of uninsurance at the threshold 
ranging between 25 to 30 percentage points. Figures 2A and 2B show the 
enrollment and “uninsurance” separately by regions of Colombia as well. It is 
worth noting than SR enrollment falls short of 100% at low (calculated) SISBEN 
scores. This may not only be due to mistargeting, but also to our use of household 
survey data (rather than official data) to construct SISBEN scores  
Using our re-coded variable below to instrument for enroll, we then estimate the 
following equation by 2SLS: 
(4)   outcomeihc = φ + λenrollihc + θSISBENh + ψSISBEN_diffhc + Σkπkestratohk + μc + ξihc, 
where the estimate of interest is the estimate of λ.26 Section IVF shows that our 
results are robust across bandwidths to including higher-order relative SISBEN 
score polynomials, using interactions between relative SISBEN scores and 
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 Because eligibility thresholds vary by county, our approach essentially averages across sample 
respondents with different absolute SISBEN scores. To investigate how our estimates vary with 
absolute SISBEN score, we also estimate variants of equation (4) below with interactions between 
SR enrollment and absolute SISBEN score (instrumenting for this term with interactions between 
an indicator for falling below county-specific thresholds and absolute SISBEN score) and find 
insignificant estimates for this interaction term (see Section IVG). 
26
 We estimate equations (3) and (4) using linear models; marginal probabilities computed using 
bivariate probit models yield similar results to the 2SLS estimates for dichotomous outcomes 
examined throughout the paper. We calculate our standard errors clustered by county. 
simulated eligibility, and excluding county fixed effects. We also estimate λ using 
local linear regression without any covariates other than relative SISBEN score.
27
 
Limitations of the Empirical Strategy.—Although our approach addresses key 
irregularities in SR implementation, it also has shortcomings. First, because the 
ECV and DHS household survey data that we use to calculate SISBEN scores was 
collected after official SISBEN classification, our calculations presumably 
include measurement error (even absent manipulation of official SISBEN status). 
Second, our estimates of county-specific eligibility thresholds presumably do not 
match those used in practice exactly, introducing additional noise into the 
relationship between our measure of simulated eligibility and actual enrollment. 
Third, manipulation of official SISBEN scores further weakens the strength of the 
first stage relationship. Fourth, our sample sizes are relatively small in the 
neighborhood of the eligibility thresholds. Overall, these limitations clearly 
compromise the power of our estimates (few are significant at significance 
thresholds below α=0.10) and suggest that our results should also be interpreted as 
lower bounds.  
IV. Results 
This section presents empirical evidence on a variety of important behavioral 
responses to the SR. We begin by demonstrating that both background 
characteristics not influenced by the program and participation in other social 
programs using SISBEN are balanced across estimated SR eligibility thresholds. 
We then investigate the effectiveness of health insurance in protecting households 
against financial risk (and possibly changing the optimal composition of 
household spending and assets). Next, we study changes in the use of traditionally 
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 For comparison, we also estimate equation (4) by OLS and show the results at the bottom of our 
tables. 
under-utilized preventive services in light of the SR’s emphasis on allocative 
efficiency. In doing so, we also examine changes in health outcomes that are 
sensitive to the use of important preventive services.  We then analyze how SR 
enrollment is related to changes in the use of curative medicine. To investigate 
possible behavioral distortions, we also test for reductions in private health 
investments (ex ante moral hazard) and insurance ‘crowd-out’ associated with SR 
enrollment. Finally, we assess the robustness of our estimates through a variety of 
additional parametric and non-parametric specifications.
28
 
A. Balance across Discontinuous Eligibility Thresholds 
Our empirical approach assumes that no individual or household characteristics 
– other than SR enrollment – that could influence the outcomes of interest vary 
discontinuously across our estimated eligibility thresholds. To test this 
assumption, Table 2 shows results obtained by estimating equations (3) and (4) 
for individual attributes that could not reasonably change in response to SR 
enrollment (such as age or educational attainment among adults). Consistent with 
our assumption, the estimates are not generally distinguishable from zero. 
(Examining the distribution of simulated SISBEN scores across eligibility 
discontinuities, Appendix C shows evidence in support of this assumption as 
well.) 
We then consider whether or not our estimates from equation (4) could be 
attributed to participation in other public programs that also use the SISBEN 
index.  Before investigating this possibility directly, we first note that it is 
unlikely because these programs use the uniform national eligibility threshold, 
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 As expected, power is lower in all analyses if we use the uniform national threshold rather than 
estimated county-specific ones. In contrast to the F statistics shown in our main tables, using the 
uniform national threshold yields first stage F statics of 4.7 in the ECV and 18 in the DHS. Even 
so, many of our key results on health care use and health outcomes are nonetheless present when 
we use the uniform national threshold. 
while we estimate and utilize de facto county-specific thresholds for the SR – 
many of which fall below the uniform national threshold. To confirm this, we re-
estimate equations (3) and (4) using a dichotomous indicator for participation in 
these other programs – including job training, home mortgage subsidies, 
education vouchers, Hogares Comunitarios (a large child care program), and 
services provided by the Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar (the largest 
social welfare agency in Colombia) – as the dependent variable in equation (4).29 
Table 2 presents these results, suggesting that participation in other programs is 
also balanced across county-specific SR eligibility thresholds. 
B. Financial Risk Protection and Portfolio Choice 
Although a key innovation of the SR is its emphasis on allocative efficiency, a 
central objective of any health insurance program is to provide protection against 
financial risk. We therefore begin by examining the relationship between SR 
enrollment and both level and variability of out-of-pocket medical spending. To 
construct our variability measure, we first calculate mean individual spending 
separately among those enrolled and those not enrolled in the SR. For each 
individual, we then measure the difference between each individual’s spending 
and the mean among those with the same enrollment status, constructing our 
variability measure as the absolute value of this difference. We analyze outpatient 
and inpatient out-of-pocket spending (within the past twelve months) separately 
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 The program Empleo en Acción (a workfare program active in 2003 but abolished in 2004) is 
the only public program of which we are aware that used the uniform national SISBEN eligibility 
threshold for which the 2003 ECV does not contain data. Participation in the program was low 
(only 7.4% of those in SISBEN strata 1 or 2) and provided no benefits directly related to health (it 
paid 60% of the minimum wage to individuals who worked on official program projects an 
average of at least 30 hours per week for 2.4 months) (IFS-SEI-Econometria 2005). We do not 
have information about participation in Familias en Acción, a Colombian conditional cash transfer 
program, but the eligibility threshold for this program (36) is considerably lower, falling more 
than two standard deviations below the mean of our estimated SR thresholds. 
and emphasize the latter because of idiosyncrasies in how outpatient spending is 
reported.
30
 
We first graphically examine shifts in the distribution of medical spending 
associated with simulated eligibility for the SR. Figure 3 shows cumulative 
density functions for inpatient medical spending in the preceding year separately 
for those falling above and below county-specific thresholds (using our sample of 
those within two index points of the cutoff).
31
 Both distributions are heavily right-
skewed, but mass in the distribution for those who are eligible (those below the 
threshold) falls to the left of the distribution for those who are ineligible. No 
clearly comparable pattern is present for outpatient medical spending (Figure 4). 
Overall, these figures suggest that SR eligibility is associated with reductions in 
right-tail inpatient medical spending – a pattern consistent with risk protection.32 
The first four columns of Panel A in Table 3 then present econometric results 
obtained by estimating equations (3) and (4) for medical spending by type. The 
first row presents IV estimates for SR enrollment, and the second row reports 
intent-to-treat (ITT) estimates for simulated SR eligibility (estimates for a dummy 
variable coding whether or not an individual falls below the eligibility threshold 
obtained by OLS regressions of outcomes on this dummy and the other covariates 
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 The ECV 2003 question about outpatient spending in the preceding 30 days excludes outpatient 
costs associated with illness ultimately leading to hospitalization; the inpatient expenditure 
question asks about all inpatient spending in the past 12 months. 
31
 These graphs do not correspond exactly to our formal RD estimates for several reasons. One is 
that they only include observations with positive expenditures and hence do not capture 
differential selection into any spending between those above vs. below the eligibility threshold. 
Another is that using our bandwidth of two sample, they depict mean differences between those 
above vs. below the eligibility threshold (rather than differences between the two groups as one 
converges to the threshold from above vs. below). Conducting a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for 
equality of distributions, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis of equality, presumably 
because of these limitations and small sample sizes when conditioning on any spending. They are 
nonetheless suggestive. 
32
 These figures may understate the magnitude of risk protection under the SR for two reasons: (1) 
some people may not receive medical care at all, but nonetheless incur non-medical financial 
expenses due to poor health, and (2) the figures show densities by eligibility rather than 
enrollment status (because enrollment is endogenous). 
in equation 4). The first column suggests that SR enrollment lowers mean 
inpatient spending by about 60,000 pesos (α=0.10), around a 30% reduction 
among those using any inpatient services. Perhaps more importantly for assessing 
protection against financial risk, the third column shows that SR enrollment is 
associated with reductions in the variability of inpatient medical spending 
(α=0.05).33 There is no statistically significant association for outpatient care. 
Appendix D Figure 1 graphically shows all outcomes examined in Panel A across 
county-specific eligibility thresholds (essentially, graphical versions of our intent-
to-treat analyses). 
Overall, the results shown in Table 3 Panel A suggest that SR enrollment is 
associated with meaningful risk protection benefits. By reducing household 
exposure to financial risk, SR enrollment could also produce meaningful changes 
in the composition of household assets, human capital investments, and household 
consumption (i.e., portfolio choice effects). Specifically, it may increase 
investments not previously undertaken because of costly informal risk-
management activities (such as precautionary saving). Panel B of Table 3 presents 
estimates for durable goods not used to construct the SISBEN index (car and 
radio ownership) as well as household education and consumption expenditures. 
In general, it implies that SR enrollment is not associated with discernible 
portfolio choice effects (perhaps because the SR falls short of providing full 
insurance). 
C. Preventive Service Use and Health Status 
As described earlier, a key innovation of the SR is its focus on improving 
allocative efficiency in medical care. In particular, increasing the use of highly 
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 Although this result is unsurprising given that Colombia’s reform caps the amount that SR 
enrolees are required to pay out-of-pocket, it cannot be taken for granted in a developing country 
context. For example, Wagstaff and Lindelow (2008) find that health insurance in China increases 
financial risk due to a combination of poor regulation and asymmetric information.  
beneficial preventive services – many of which produce large positive 
externalities – is likely to improve welfare. These externalities are due both to 
reduced rates of infectious disease transmission and to reduced curative care costs 
borne by others through risk pools. 
The first two columns of Table 4 report estimates for different types of 
preventive care use obtained from equations (3) and (4) (Appendix D Figure 2 
shows graphical versions of the intent-to-treat analyses). In general, they suggest 
substantial increases in the use of preventive health care services.
34
 Specifically, 
SR enrollment is associated with a 29 percentage point increase in the probability 
of a preventive physician visit in the past year (a 75% increase; α=0.01). 
Importantly, the SR is also associated with 1.50 more growth-monitoring and 
well-care visits in the past year, a 50% increase relative to uninsured children 
(α=0.05). These well-care visits are a principal way of addressing important 
childhood health problems (parents receive nutritional advice, iron supplements, 
and de-worming medications, for example – which are important for 
strengthening children’s immune systems and making them less susceptible to 
major childhood illnesses such as severe diarrhea and acute respiratory 
infections/pneumonia).
35
 
We then investigate whether or not health status has improved under the SR – 
in particular, dimensions of health that are sensitive to the use of preventive care. 
Although our preventive physician visit variable is not service-specific, our 
measure of childhood growth and development checks should correspond directly 
with infectious disease prevalence. Columns three through six of Table 4 show 
estimates for child health outcomes linked to preventive care use. SR enrollment 
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 This increase in preventive care use dominates any ex ante moral hazard (which would reduce 
prevention – although Section IVE suggests no evidence of ex ante moral hazard). 
35
 See Fogel (1994), Santos et al. (2001), Alderman (2007), Currie, Decker, and Lin (2008), 
Galasso and Umapathi (2009), and Linnemayr and Alderman (2011) on the relationship between 
preventive care and child health. 
is associated with 1.4 fewer child days absent from usual activities due to illness 
in the past month (α=0.05). Enrollment is also associated with an 18 percentage 
point reduction in the self-reported incidence of cough, fever, or diarrhea among 
children in the preceding two weeks (but it is not statistically significant at 
conventional levels). Appendix D Figure 2 shows graphical versions of the intent-
to-treat analyses for these health outcomes as well.
36
 Because these health gains 
can be linked to increases in preventive service use, they are also likely to 
improve welfare. 
D. Use of Curative Medical Care 
 As Section II discusses, there are a variety of competing incentives and 
other forces influencing curative medical care under the SR. These include 
reductions in out-of-pocket prices, increases in the use of preventive services, and 
supply-side incentives for limiting total medical spending. Predictions about 
changes in curative service use under the SR – and their welfare implications – 
are therefore ambiguous, but they remain a central interest of policymakers and 
are important for assessing the costs of Colombia’s innovative health insurance 
reform. 
Table 5 reports estimates for various categories of curative care obtained from 
equations (3) and (4) (Appendix D Figure 3 shows graphical versions of the 
intent-to-treat analyses). We find that SR enrollment is associated with a 13 
percentage point increase in reported physician visits because of health problems 
within the past 30 days (α=0.05). There is no change in use of curative care 
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 Interestingly, for some of the more statistically pronounced results (such as physician visits for 
preventive care and children’s healthy days lost due to illness), the graphical pattern of results 
shown in Figure 2 Appendix D closely resemble the graphical pattern enrollment in the SR shown 
in Figure 1: a more or less flat relationship to the left of the threshold, and a monotonic 
relationship to the right of the threshold. Although suggestive, these shape similarities must still be 
interpreted cautiously. 
among children, which may be due to improvements in child health associated 
with SR enrollment (as Table 4 shows). Finally, there is no meaningful 
relationship at conventional significance levels between participation in the SR 
and hospitalizations. 
E. Ex Ante Moral Hazard and Insurance Crowd-Out 
Protection from financial risk associated with unexpected illness weakens 
private incentives for costly health protection (ex ante moral hazard) (Pauly 
1968). Because we find evidence of greater risk protection, we investigate how 
protective private health behaviors not directly linked to medical care change with 
SR enrollment.
37
 As Table 6 Panel A and Appendix D Figure 4 show, however, 
we find no meaningful change in breastfeeding or maternal investments in fetal 
health (alcohol, drug, or tobacco use during pregnancy; or prenatal dietary 
supplementation with iron, calcium, or folic acid), suggesting little ex ante moral 
hazard associated with SR enrollment.
38
 
Manipulation of official SISBEN scores suggests that Colombians perceive 
benefits of SR enrollment, so we also investigate the possibility that SR 
enrollment displaces other forms of explicit health insurance.
39
 Table 6 Panel B 
also presents intent-to-treat (ITT) estimates obtained by estimating equation (3) 
with dichotomous indicators for Regimen Contributivo enrollment, other forms of 
health insurance (those for the military, police officers, and certain industrial 
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 More generally, private health behaviors and public health services could theoretically be either 
complements or substitutes for publicly provided health services. While reductions in the price of 
medical care may raise the return to private health investments given competing risks, cheaper 
health services could also instead ‘crowd-out’ costly private health behaviors (Dow, Holmes, 
Philipson, and Sala-i-Martin 1999, Murphy and Topel 2003). 
38
 We cannot rule-out the possibility that social desirability bias in reporting might attenuate a true 
effect. 
39
 Formal sector employees are mandated to enroll in an employment-based health insurance 
system called Regimen Contributivo. This mandate holds even for individuals with SISBEN scores 
falling below the SISBEN eligibility threshold for the SR. 
groups like oil industry workers, for example), and “uninsurance” as dependent 
variables. The Regimen Contributivo estimates are generally small (-0.02 in the 
ECV and -0.05 in the DHS) and the latter is statistically significant (α=0.05), 
suggesting that some modest crowding-out of formal insurance may have 
occurred. 
F. Robustness 
To investigate the robustness of our results, we estimate a variety of alternative 
parametric and non-parametric specifications based on our main estimating 
equations. First, we re-estimate equations (3) and (4) using SISBEN score 
bandwidths ranging between two and four. Second, at each bandwidth we 
estimate specifications that include higher order polynomials of relative SISBEN 
scores (including squared, cubic, and fourth power terms) as well as models that 
include interactions between relative SISBEN scores and simulated eligibility 
(although allowing SISBEN gradients to vary on either side of the eligibility 
threshold should matter little given our narrow bandwidth). Third, we re-estimate 
specifications that do not include county fixed effects (at each bandwidth), 
allowing us also to make cross-county comparisons among individuals with 
identical simulated SISBEN scores but that fall on opposite sides of county-
specific eligibility thresholds. Finally, we also estimate models using non-
parametric local linear regression.
40
 As Tables 1-4 of Appendix E show that our 
results are generally robust (with some variation in precision) across these 
alternative bandwidths and specifications. 
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 Specifically, we use local linear regression functions with triangle kernels to estimate 
conditional means of outcome variables (conditioning on SISBEN_diff) on either side of the 
eligibility threshold, and we repeat this estimation process for enrollment in the SR. We then 
construct Wald statistics using differences in the estimated conditional means of the outcome 
variable on either side of the threshold as numerators and the difference in the conditional mean of 
SR enrollment on either side of the threshold as the denominator. We estimate our standard errors 
using 250 bootstrap replications. Details of the implementation can be found in Nichols (2007). 
G. Heterogeneity and External Validity 
While RD estimates can have good internal validity, their external validity is 
often limited because they typically utilize a sample only in the neighborhood of 
the discontinuity (Imbens and Lemieux 2008, Lee and Lemieux 2010). However, 
because SR eligibility thresholds vary by county, our empirical strategy allows us 
to investigate the external validity of our estimates by extending equation (4) to 
include interactions between absolute SISBEN score and SR enrollment.
41
 This 
allows us to test for heterogeneity by SISBEN score, a summary measure of 
socio-economic status. As Appendix F Tables 1-4 show, we find little evidence of 
heterogeneous effects, suggesting that our estimates are not sensitive to local 
variation in SISBEN scores and may therefore apply to a broader range of the 
Colombian population.
42
 We note, however, that the interaction terms’ standard 
errors are large, so our power to detect heterogeneity is limited. 
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 Specifically, we estimate: outcomeihc = φ + λenrollihc + θSISBENh +δ(enrollihc×SISBENh) + 
ψSISBEN_diffhc + Σkπkestratohk + μc + ξihc, using belowhc and (belowhc×SISBENh) as instruments. 
All variables are defined as in equations (3) and (4). 
42
 The fifth row of Appendix F Tables 1-4 shows implied effects of Subsidized Regime enrollment 
evaluated at the average SISBEN score (45) and their accompanying p-values. The magnitude and 
significance of these effect sizes generally match the estimates in Tables 3-6. 
V. Conclusion 
This paper studies the role of Colombia’s Régimen Subsidiado in protecting the 
poor against financial risk, influencing their use of health services, and ultimately 
affecting their health status. Unusual among middle- and low-income countries at 
the time of its introduction, the SR is a publicly-financed health insurance 
program with features of managed care emphasizing allocative efficiency that are 
traditionally only found in wealthy countries. We find evidence that the SR 
provides some protection against financial risk and is associated with greater use 
of preventive services having positive externalities – as well as with measurable 
health gains among children. 
Pinpointing the mechanisms through which complex insurance programs such 
as SR work is an important topic of future research. In our case, because 
preventive services are generally free regardless of insurance status, one plausible 
interpretation of the increase in prevention that we observe links them to the SR’s 
high-powered supply-side incentives (if providers with capitated contracts believe 
that prevention is cost-saving). Another potentially important channel is patient 
substitution from public to private sector providers contracting with insurance 
plans under the SR (if private providers were more likely to supply preventive 
care). Although we suspect that these two mechanisms may be most salient, we 
cannot rule out others (individual feeling more comfortable going to the doctor 
when insured, the provision of insurance making the universal entitlement to 
preventive care more salient, etc.).  
We conclude by emphasizing that the welfare-improving potential of SR has yet 
to be fully realized. For example, a variety of political concessions followed the 
creation of the SR – including exemptions from the end of government subsidies 
as well as requirements that insurers contract with public facilities for a minimum 
share of the services that they finance. These concessions presumably limit the 
ability of health plans to contract with medical care providers in ways that best 
encourage higher quality and lower cost services. 
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FIGURE 1. SUBSIDIZED REGIME ENROLLMENT AND 'UNINSURANCE'  
ACROSS SISBEN ELIGIBILITY THRESHOLDS 
Notes: Source of Figure A is ECV 2003 and of Figure B is DHS 2005 
  
FIGURE 2. SUBSIDIZED REGIME ENROLLMENT AND 'UNINSURANCE' ACROSS SISBEN  
ELIGIBILITY THRESHOLDS BY REGION 
 
FIGURE 3. INDIVIDUAL INPATIENT MEDICAL SPENDING (AMONG THOSE WITHIN  
TWO POINTS OF COUNTY-SPECIFIC ELIGIBILITY THRESHOLDS) 
Notes: Source ECV 2003 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4. INDIVIDUAL OUTPATIENT MEDICAL SPENDING (AMONG THOSE WITHIN  
TWO POINTS OF COUNTY-SPECIFIC ELIGIBILITY THRESHOLDS) 
Notes: Source ECV 2003 
 
 
 
TABLE 1— DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Mean SD N
Risk Protection, Consumption Smoothing, and Portfolio Choice
Individual Inpatient Medical Spending 10,794 129,777 4219 ECV
Individual Outpatient Medical Spending 2,118 22,565 4218 ECV
Variability of Individual Inpatient Medical Spending 21,935 127,975 4219 ECV
Variability of Individual Outpatient Medical Spending 5,477 21,993 4218 ECV
Individual Education Spending 7,588 20,279 3567 ECV
Household Education Spending 35,145 48,468 4222 ECV
Total Spending on Food 274,881 217,392 4096 ECV
Total Monthly Expenditure 654,552 599,861 966 ECV
Has Car 0.03 0.16 3334 DHS
Has Radio 0.61 0.49 3334 DHS
Preventive Physician Visit 0.47 0.50 4222 ECV
Number of Growth Development Checks Last Year 1.16 1.81 1167 DHS
Curative Care Use (Not Conditional on Health Status) 0.06 0.24 4222 ECV
Primary Care 0.05 0.21 4222 ECV
Medical Visit - Specialist 0.02 0.12 4222 ECV
Hospital Stay 0.08 0.26 4222 ECV
Medical Visit for Chronic Disease 0.58 0.49 564 ECV
Curative Care Use among Children (Not Conditional on Health Status) 0.31 0.46 1161 DHS
Child Days Lost to Illness 0.60 2.01 1161 DHS
Cough, Fever Diarrhea 0.56 0.50 1167 DHS
Any Health Problem 0.65 0.48 1161 DHS
Birthweight (KG) 3.26 0.57 897 DHS
Drank Alcohol during Pregnancy 0.11 0.31 998 DHS
Number of Drinks per Week during Pregnancy 2.75 9.76 110 DHS
Months Child Breastfed 12.58 10.87 946 DHS
Folic Acid During Pregnancy 0.54 0.50 988 DHS
Number Months Folic Acid during Pregnancy 3.96 2.42 515 DHS
Contributory Regime Enrollment 0.09 0.29 4222 ECV
Contributory Regime Enrollment 0.14 0.34 3334 DHS
Other Health Insurance 0.44 0.50 4222 ECV
Other Health Insurance 0.01 0.09 3334 DHS
Uninsured 0.00 0.06 4222 ECV
Uninsured 0.38 0.49 3334 DHS
Balance
Household Head Age 46.81 14.81 3334 DHS
Household Head Age 46.58 14.79 4222 ECV
Completed Elementary School 0.18 0.39 3333 DHS
Completed Elementary School 0.19 0.39 3764 ECV
Completed Secondary School 0.20 0.40 3333 DHS
Completed Secondary School 0.07 0.26 3764 ECV
Household Head Completed Elementary School 0.30 0.46 3334 DHS
Household Head Completed Elementary School 0.28 0.45 4222 ECV
Household Head Completed Secondary School 0.02 0.15 3334 DHS
Household Head Completed Secondary School 0.02 0.13 4222 ECV
Student Received School Grant 0.08 0.26 1305 ECV
Benefits to Buy House 0.01 0.08 4222 ECV
Attended Training 0.05 0.21 3010 ECV
Household in Hogar Comunitario program 0.10 0.30 4222 ECV
Services from Bienstar Familiar 0.18 0.38 4222 ECV
Notes : All data summarized is from samples of "urban" individuals within two SISBEN index points of county-specific eligibility thresholds in either the 2003
Encuesta de Calidad de Vida (ECV) or the 2005 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) (as indicated in the last column). SISBEN index calculations are described in
detail in Appendix 2, and estimation of county-specific eligibility thresholds is presented in Section IIIB. The first group of three columns present summary
statistics for the entire bandwidth of 2 sample, the second group for those not enrolled in the Subsidized Regime, and the third group for those enrolled in the
Subsidized Regime.
Total Data 
Source
Variable
Medical Care Use
Health Status
Behavioral Distortions
Baseline Demographic Variables
Outcome Variables
 
TABLE 1 (CONT.) —DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Mean SD N Mean SD N
Risk Protection, Consumption Smoothing, and Portfolio Choice
Individual Inpatient Medical Spending 11,360 129,227 2252 10,145 130,435 1967 ECV
Individual Outpatient Medical Spending 2,513 20,170 2249 1,666 25,019 1969 ECV
Variability of Individual Inpatient Medical Spending 26,338 126,615 2252 16,894 129,363 1967 ECV
Variability of Individual Outpatient Medical Spending 7,343 19,017 2249 3,347 24,796 1969 ECV
Individual Education Spending 7,501 23,234 1874 7,684 16,407 1693 ECV
Household Education Spending 34,089 52,464 2253 36,352 43,428 1969 ECV
Total Spending on Food 279,128 201,735 2171 270,091 233,756 1925 ECV
Total Monthly Expenditure 688,065 716,382 479 621,590 455,559 487 ECV
Has Car 0.03 0.18 1758 0.02 0.15 1576 DHS
Has Radio 0.60 0.49 1758 0.62 0.49 1576 DHS
Medical Care Use
Preventive Physician Visit 0.39 0.49 2253 0.57 0.49 1969 ECV
Number of Growth Development Checks Last Year 1.00 1.75 683 1.38 1.87 484 DHS
Curative Care Use (Not Conditional on Health Status) 0.06 0.23 2253 0.07 0.26 1969 ECV
Primary Care 0.04 0.20 2253 0.06 0.23 1969 ECV
Medical Visit - Specialist 0.01 0.12 2253 0.02 0.13 1969 ECV
Hospital Stay 0.07 0.25 2253 0.08 0.28 1969 ECV
Medical Visit for Chronic Disease 0.52 0.50 262 0.64 0.48 302 ECV
Curative Care Use among Children (Not Conditional on Health Status) 0.29 0.45 680 0.34 0.48 481 DHS
Health Status
Child Days Lost to Illness 0.65 2.14 680 0.53 1.82 481 DHS
Cough, Fever Diarrhea 0.56 0.50 682 0.56 0.50 485 DHS
Any Health Problem 0.64 0.48 680 0.66 0.47 481 DHS
Birthweight (KG) 3.25 0.53 534 3.27 0.63 363 DHS
Behavioral Distortions
Drank Alcohol during Pregnancy 0.12 0.32 504 0.10 0.30 494 DHS
Number of Drinks per Week during Pregnancy 3.15 10.85 60 2.28 8.36 50 DHS
Months Child Breastfed 11.15 10.18 578 14.83 11.53 368 DHS
Folic Acid During Pregnancy 0.56 0.50 500 0.53 0.50 488 DHS
Number Months Folic Acid during Pregnancy 4.05 2.39 266 3.86 2.45 249 DHS
Contributory Regime Enrollment 0.17 0.38 2253 0.00 0.00 1969 ECV
Contributory Regime Enrollment 0.26 0.44 1758 0.00 0.00 1576 DHS
Other Health Insurance 0.82 0.39 2253 0.00 0.00 1969 ECV
Other Health Insurance 0.01 0.12 1758 0.00 0.00 1576 DHS
Uninsured 0.01 0.08 2253 0.00 0.00 1969 ECV
Uninsured 0.73 0.45 1758 0.00 0.00 1576 DHS
Balance
Household Head Age 47.36 15.37 1758 46.18 14.14 1576 DHS
Household Head Age 45.71 15.12 2253 47.57 14.35 1969 ECV
Completed Elementary School 0.18 0.38 1757 0.19 0.39 1576 DHS
Completed Elementary School 0.18 0.39 1985 0.19 0.39 1779 ECV
Completed Secondary School 0.21 0.41 1757 0.19 0.39 1576 DHS
Completed Secondary School 0.08 0.27 1985 0.07 0.25 1779 ECV
Household Head Completed Elementary School 0.29 0.45 1758 0.31 0.46 1576 DHS
Household Head Completed Elementary School 0.27 0.45 2253 0.28 0.45 1969 ECV
Household Head Completed Secondary School 0.02 0.13 1758 0.03 0.18 1576 DHS
Household Head Completed Secondary School 0.01 0.11 2253 0.02 0.15 1969 ECV
Student Received School Grant 0.05 0.22 651 0.10 0.30 654 ECV
Benefits to Buy House 0.00 0.06 2253 0.01 0.10 1969 ECV
Attended Training 0.06 0.23 1593 0.04 0.19 1417 ECV
Household in Hogar Comunitario program 0.09 0.29 2253 0.11 0.31 1969 ECV
Services from Bienstar Familiar 0.16 0.37 2253 0.20 0.40 1969 ECV
Notes : All data summarized is from samples of "urban" individuals within two SISBEN index points of county-specific eligibility thresholds in either the 2003 Encuesta de Calidad de Vida (ECV) or the
2005 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) (as indicated in the last column). SISBEN indexcalculations are described in detail in Appendix 2, and estimation of county-specific eligibility thresholds is
presented in Section IIIB. The first group of three columns present summary statistics for the entire bandwidth of 2 sample, the second group for those not enrolled in the Subsidized Regime, and the
third group for those enrolled in the Subsidized Regime.
Not Enrolled in the Subsidized 
Regime
 Enrolled in the Subsidized Regime Data 
Source
Variable
Outcome Variables
Baseline Demographic Variables
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2—BALANCE ACROSS ELIGIBILITY THRESHOLDS 
Outcome
Household 
Head Age
Household 
Head Age
Completed 
Elementary 
School
Completed 
Elementary 
School
Completed 
Secondary 
School
Completed 
Secondary 
School
Household 
Head 
Completed 
Elementary 
School
Household 
Head 
Completed 
Elementary 
School
2SLS Estimate, Subsidized Regime Enrollment 4.38 3.05 0.01 -0.15 0.03 0.05 -0.09 -0.37
[3.05] [7.68] [0.08] [0.10] [0.07] [0.05] [0.12] [0.24]
Intent to Treat Estimate 1.77 0.79 0.01 -0.04** 0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.10**
[1.22] [1.84] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.01] [0.05] [0.05]
First Stage Estimate, Below Eligibility Threshold 0.40*** 0.26*** 0.40*** 0.25*** 0.40*** 0.25*** 0.40*** 0.26***
[0.04] [0.07] [0.04] [0.06] [0.04] [0.06] [0.04] [0.07]
First Stage F-Statistic 125.75 14.08 125.91 17.02 125.91 17.02 125.75 14.08
OLS Estimate -0.04 1.62*** 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.01
[0.66] [0.55] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02]
Mean for those Not Enrolled in the Subsidized 
Regime
47.36 45.71 0.18 0.18 0.21 0.08 0.29 0.27
Observations 3,334 4,222 3,333 3,764 3,333 3,764 3,334 4,222
Data Source DHS ECV DHS ECV DHS ECV DHS ECV
Outcome
Household 
Head 
Completed 
Secondary 
School
Household 
Head 
Completed 
Secondary 
School
Student 
Received 
School 
Grant
Benefits to 
Buy House
Attended 
Training
Household 
in Hogar 
Comunitario 
Program
Services 
from 
Bienestar 
Familiar
2SLS Estimate, Subsidized Regime Enrollment -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.04
[0.03] [0.07] [0.11] [0.01] [0.04] [0.08] [0.13]
Intent to Treat Estimate -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00** 0.00 0.01 -0.01
[0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.00] [0.01] [0.02] [0.03]
First Stage Estimate, Below Eligibility Threshold 0.40*** 0.26*** 0.21*** 0.26*** 0.27*** 0.26*** 0.26***
[0.04] [0.07] [0.09] [0.07] [0.06] [0.07] [0.07]
First Stage F-Statistic 125.75 14.08 5.17 14.08 23.45 14.08 14.08
OLS Estimate 0.01* 0.01 0.03 0.00** -0.02*** 0.01 0.02
[0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.02]
Mean for those Not Enrolled in the Subsidized 
Regime
0.02 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.06 0.09 0.16
Observations 3,334 4,222 1,305 4,222 3,010 4,222 4,222
Data Source DHS ECV ECV ECV ECV ECV ECV
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
Panel A
Panel B
Notes : Individual-level “urban” data for those within two SISBEN indexpoints of county-specific eligibility thresholds from the 2003 ECVand 2005 DHS. Dependent variables
are shown at the top of each column. The first row shows 2SLS estimates for enrollment in the Subsidized Regime (SR), instrumenting for SR enrollment using simulated
eligibility. The second row shows reduced-form intent-to-treat estimates for simulated SISBEN score falling below the county-specific eligibility threshold. The third row
shows first stage estimates from OLS regressions of Subsidized Regime enrollment on an indicator for falling below the county-specific eligibility threshold. All specifications
also include SISBEN score, distance from the county-specific threshold, estrato dummy variables, and county fixed effects.  Standard errors (clustered by county) are shown *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
 
 
 
Table 3—RISK PROTECTION AND PORTFOLIO CHOICE 
Outcome
Individual 
Inpatient 
Medical 
Spending
Individual 
Outpatient 
Medical 
Spending
Variability of 
Individual 
Inpatient 
Medical 
Spending
Variability of 
Individual 
Outpatient 
Medical 
Spending
2SLS Estimate, Subsidized Regime Enrollment -58,870* 3,562 -67,499.38** 167.57
[33,263] [2,702] [32,906] [2,417]
Intent to Treat Estimate -15,108* 918.23 -17322.90* 43.20
[8,888] [821] [9,120] [626]
First Stage Estimate, Below Eligibility Threshold 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26***
[0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07]
First Stage F-Statistic 13.91 14.01 13.91 14.01
OLS Estimate -5,655 -1,204*** -13,888*** -4,387***
[3,898] [342] [3,893] [357]
Mean for those Not Enrolled in the Subsidized Regime 11,359.86 2,512.98 26338.40 7342.59
Observations 4,219 4,218 4,219 4,218
Data Source ECV ECV ECV ECV
Panel B: Portfolio Choice
Outcome
Individual 
Education 
Spending
Household 
Education 
Spending
Total 
Spending on 
Food
Total Monthly 
Expenditure
Has Car Has Radio
2SLS Estimate, Subsidized Regime Enrollment -341.68 30,366 32,136 -33,826 0.01 0.17
[3,781] [25,055] [103,540] [278,060] [0.04] [0.11]
Intent to Treat Estimate -84.72 7,815 8,709 -14,036 0.01 0.07
[945] [4,880] [28,491] [115,736] [0.01] [0.05]
First Stage Estimate, Below Eligibility Threshold 0.25*** 0.26*** 0.27*** 0.41*** 0.40*** 0.40***
[0.06] [0.07] [0.06] [0.12] [0.04] [0.04]
First Stage F-Statistic 19.28 14.08 18.80 12.18 125.75 125.75
OLS Estimate 122.82 2,952.32*** -12,036 -39,273 -0.01 0.03
[231] [902] [10,330] [58,730] [0.01] [0.02]
Mean for those Not Enrolled in the Subsidized Regime 7,501 34,089 279,128 688,065 0.03 0.60
Observations 3,567 4,222 4,096 966 3,334 3,334
Data Source ECV ECV ECV ECV DHS DHS
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
Panel A: Risk Protection
Notes : Individual-level “urban” data for those within two SISBEN index points of county-specific eligibility thresholds from the 2003 ECV and 2005 DHS. Dependent
variables are shown at the top of each column. The first row shows 2SLS estimates for enrollment in the Subsidized Regime (SR), instrumenting for SR enrollment using
simulated eligibility. The second row shows reduced-form intent-to-treat estimates for simulated SISBEN score falling below the county-specific eligibility threshold. The
third row shows first stage estimates from OLS regressions of Subsidized Regime enrollment on an indicator for falling below the county-specific eligibility threshold. All
specifications also include SISBEN score, distance from the county-specific threshold, estrato dummy variables, and county fixed effects. Standard errors (clustered by
county) are shown in brackets below each estimate. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4—USE OF PREVENTIVE MEDICAL CARE AND HEALTH STATUS 
Outcome
Preventive 
Physician 
Visit
Number of 
Growth 
Dev. 
Checks Last 
Year
Child Days 
Lost to 
Illness
Cough, 
Fever, 
Diarrhea
Any Health 
Problem
Birthweight 
(KG)
2SLS Estimate, Subsidized Regime Enrollment 0.29*** 1.50** -1.40** -0.18 -0.06 0.26
[0.11] [0.69] [0.65] [0.17] [0.18] [0.29]
Intent to Treat Estimate 0.08*** 0.55** -0.49** -0.07 -0.02 0.11
[0.03] [0.25] [0.20] [0.06] [0.06] [0.12]
First Stage Estimate, Below Eligibility Threshold 0.26*** 0.36*** 0.35*** 0.37*** 0.35*** 0.41***
[0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.09]
First Stage F-Statistic 14.08 25.24 23.46 25.19 23.46 19.10
OLS Estimate 0.17*** 0.33*** -0.04 0.01 0.03 0.04
[0.01] [0.12] [0.17] [0.04] [0.04] [0.05]
Mean for those Not Enrolled in the Subsidized Regime 0.39 1.00 0.65 0.56 0.64 3.25
Observations 4,222 1,167 1,161 1,167 1,161 897
Data Source ECV DHS DHS DHS DHS DHS
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
Use of Preventive Care Health Status (Children)
Notes : Individual-level “urban” data for those within two SISBEN index points of county-specific eligibility thresholds from the 2003 ECV and 2005 DHS.
Dependent variables are shown at the top of each column. The first row shows 2SLS estimates for enrollment in the Subsidized Regime (SR), instrumenting for
SR enrollment using simulated eligibility. The second row shows reduced-form intent-to-treat estimates for simulated SISBEN score falling below the county
specific eligibility threshold. The third row shows first stage estimates from OLS regressions of Subsidized Regime enrollment on an indicator for falling below
the county-specific eligibility threshold. All specifications also include SISBEN score, distance from the county-specific threshold, estrato dummy variables,
and county fixed effects.  Standard errors (clustered by county) are shown in brackets below each estimate.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 
 
 
Table 5—USE OF CURATIVE MEDICAL CARE 
Outcome
Curative Use 
(Not 
Conditonal on 
Health Status)
Curative Use 
among 
Children (Not 
Conditional on 
Health Status)
Medical Visit 
for Chronic 
Disease
Hospital Stay
2SLS Estimate, Subsidized Regime Enrollment 0.13** -0.00 0.51* -0.04
[0.05] [0.16] [0.28] [0.11]
Intent to Treat Estimate 0.03* 0.00 0.18*** -0.01
[0.02] [0.06] [0.06] [0.03]
First Stage Estimate, Below Eligibility Threshold 0.26*** 0.35*** 0.35*** 0.26***
[0.07] [0.07] [0.10] [0.07]
First Stage F-Statistic 14.08 23.46 13.49 14.08
OLS Estimate 0.03*** 0.07* 0.13*** 0.02**
[0.01] [0.04] [0.03] [0.01]
Mean for those Not Enrolled in the Subsidized Regime 0.06 0.29 0.52 0.07
Observations 4,222 1,161 564 4,222
Data Source ECV DHS ECV ECV
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
Notes : Individual-level “urban” data for those within two SISBEN index points of county-specific eligibility thresholds from the 2003 ECV
and 2005 DHS. Dependent variables are shown at the top of each column. The first row shows 2SLS estimates for enrollment in the
Subsidized Regime (SR), instrumenting for SR enrollment using simulated eligibility. The second row shows reduced-form intent-to-treat
estimates for simulated SISBEN score falling below the county specific eligibility threshold. The third row shows first stage estimates from
OLS regressions of Subsidized Regime enrollment on an indicator for falling below the county-specific eligibility threshold. All
specifications also include SISBEN score, distance from the county-specific threshold, estrato dummy variables, and county fixed effects.
Standard errors (clustered by county) are shown in brackets below each estimate. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
 
 
 
Table 6—BEHAVIORAL DISTORTION – EX ANTE MORAL HAZARD AND INSURANCE CROWD-OUT 
Outcome
Drank 
Alcohol 
during 
Pregnancy
Months 
Breastfed as 
Child
Folic Acid 
During 
Pregnancy
2SLS Estimate, Subsidized Regime Enrollment -0.10 -0.23 0.10
[0.11] [5.36] [0.18]
Intent to Treat Estimate -0.04 -0.07 0.04
[0.04] [1.64] [0.07]
First Stage Estimate, Below Eligibility Threshold 0.40*** 0.31*** 0.41***
[0.07] [0.07] [0.07]
First Stage F-Statistic 28.83 19.00 30.12
OLS Estimate -0.02 4.02*** 0.02
[0.02] [0.91] [0.03]
Mean for those Not Enrolled in the Subsidized Regime 0.12 11.15 0.56
Observations 998 946 988
Data Source DHS DHS DHS
Outcome
Contributory 
Regime 
Enrollment
Uninsured
Other Health 
Insurance
Contributory 
Regime 
Enrollment
Uninsured
Other Health 
Insurance
Intent to Treat Estimate -0.02 -0.23*** -0.00 -0.05** -0.35*** -0.01*
[0.02] [0.06] [0.00] [0.02] [0.04] [0.01]
Mean for those Not Enrolled in the Subsidized Regime 0.17 0.01 0.82 0.26 0.73 0.01
Observations 4,222 4,222 4,222 3,334 3,334 3,334
Data Source ECV ECV ECV DHS DHS DHS
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
Panel B: Insurance Crowd-Out
Panel A: Ex-Ante Moral Hazard
Notes : Individual-level “urban” data for those within two SISBEN index points of county-specific eligibility thresholds from the 2003 ECV and 2005 DHS.
Dependent variables are shown at the top of each column. The first row shows 2SLS estimates for enrollment in the Subsidized Regime (SR), instrumenting for SR
enrollment using simulated eligibility. The second row shows reduced-form intent-to-treat estimates for simulated SISBEN score falling below the county-specific
eligibility threshold. Intent-to-treat estimates only are reported for the crowd-out analyses of other insurance types (the last sixcolumns). The third row shows
first stage estimates from OLS regressions of Subsidized Regime enrollment on an indicator for falling below the county-specific eligibility threshold. All
specifications also include SISBEN score, distance from the county-specific threshold, estrato dummy variables, and county fixed effects. Standard errors
(clustered by household) are shown in brackets below each estimate. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 
